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ABSTRACT 
  Punitive damages are one of the most controversial aspects of tort litigation and 
have been the subject of various theoretical, empirical, and experimental studies. One 
criticism of punitive damages refers to the effect that they have on civil litigation 
processes. In particular, Polinsky (1997) argues that the uncertainty and unpredictability 
that punitive damage claims inject into a case may increase both the rate and amount of 
settlements, thus implying that punitive damages carry systemic consequences for the 
general processing of tort claims. This paper represents the first, empirical examination of 
this implication. 
  With one of the largest and most comprehensive data sets of tort litigation (over 
25,000 cases filed from 1994 through 1997 in several counties in Georgia), we analyze 
both cases that are likely to have caps on punitive damage awards and cases that are 
likely to be uncapped. We examine the effect of the decision to seek punitive damages on 
several major decision points in the tort litigation process in a series of logit regression 
models. With extensive control variables for type of case and plaintiff, defendant, and 
case characteristics, we find that seeking punitive damages has no statistically significant 
effect on most phases of the tort litigation process.  
 
                                                           
1 We thank workshop participants at Emory University’s Law and Economics Colloquium and 
conference participants at the 2001 Law and Society Association and Research Committee on Sociology of 
Law International Sociological Association for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
This paper can be downloaded from http://www.terry.uga.edu/~dmustard/torts.pdf.   1
1. INTRODUCTION 
  Punitive damages are one of the most controversial aspects of tort litigation and 
have been the subject of various theoretical, empirical, and experimental studies. Critics 
maintain that punitive damage awards are highly unpredictable with large variations in 
size and that juries are ill-informed and poorly equipped to perform rational risk 
assessment. These criticisms are echoed in recent Supreme Court decisions imposing 
constitutional limits on the size of punitive damage awards.
2 Other scholars find these 
criticisms to be vastly exaggerated. They assert that punitive damage awards are rare, are 
made in appropriate cases, and the size of such awards relates strongly to compensatory 
damages.  
  Virtually all of the empirical and experimental research addressing these issues 
has focused on the outcome of trials, especially jury verdicts. Trials, however, are only 
the tip of the civil litigation iceberg. Fewer than 5% of civil cases filed result in trials 
(Eaton et al., 2000; Smith et al. 1995); plaintiffs prevail in approximately half of the tort 
cases that go to trial (DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Eaton et al., 2000; Moller, 1996)
3; and 
punitive damages are awarded in only 2-5% of the tort cases in which the plaintiff 
prevails (DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Lubin, 1998). Thus, for every 1000 tort claims 
filed, typically only 50 are resolved by trial, only 25 produce trial outcomes favorable to 
the plaintiff, and only 1.25 have a punitive damage award. Consequently, our knowledge 
                                                           
2E.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) 
(punitive damages pose an “acute danger” of arbitrary deprivation of property; instructions leave the jury 
with “wide discretion” in choosing amounts; and “presentation of evidence of a defendant’s net worth 
creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big business...”) quoting 
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994).    
3 In all tort cases the plaintiff prevails 50% of the time. There are significant differences in win 
rates for different types of tort claims. The plaintiff prevails in fewer than 40% of products liability trials 
(DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Eaton et al. 2000), a type of claim for which punitive damages are a major 
concern.    2
of punitive damages is based on the examination of fewer than two of every thousand tort 
cases filed. 
  The impact of trial outcomes on cases that are settled or not resolved by trial is 
often referred to as the “shadow effect” (Koenig, 1998; Kritzer and Zemans, 1998). 
Critics argue that the shadow effect of punitive damage awards creates social disutility. 
For example, Polinsky asserts that the uncertainty and unpredictability that a punitive 
damage claim injects into a case is likely to coerce defendants to settle a greater number 
of cases for higher amounts than they would if no punitive damage claim were involved 
(Polinsky, 1997). Similarly, Priest claims that punitive damage “claims affect the 
settlement process by increasing the litigation rate and, necessarily, the ultimate 
magnitude of settlements, even in cases settled out of court.” (Priest, 1996). While it is 
theoretically plausible that a claim for punitive damages would affect the settlement 
process, this proposition has yet to be tested empirically. 
  Our paper brings an empirical perspective to the policy debate regarding the 
shadow effect of punitive damage awards on tort cases. By utilizing one of the most 
comprehensive and unique data sets on state tort litigation, our analysis contributes to the 
burgeoning literature on punitive damages in several ways. First, it is the first paper that 
directly measures the impact of seeking punitive damages on the actual processing of tort 
claims. Second, we distinguish between cases where a statutory cap on the amount of 
punitive damages is likely to apply and cases where the cap is probably not applicable.
4 
                                                           
4 Georgia places a general limit of $250,000 on punitive damage awards. O.C.G.A. sec. 51-12-
5.1(g). The cap does not apply if the defendant acted or failed to act with “the specific intent to cause 
harm” or under the influence of alcohol or drugs. O.C.G.A. sec. 51-12-5.1(f). There is also no cap on 
punitive damages in products liability cases, but there can be only one punitive damage award “regardless 
of the number of causes of action which may arise from such act or omission” and 75% of the award “shall 
be paid into the treasury of the state…” O.C.G.A. sec. 51-12-5.1(e).   3
Thus, we offer some insights regarding the different effects of capped and uncapped 
punitive damages might have on case processing. Third, in contrast to studies that rely on 
a small set of observations, we have over 25,000 cases from six Georgia counties, making 
it one of the largest and most diverse data sets of its kind. This large size allows us to 
control for important variables and to test alternative hypotheses that are often not 
considered. Fourth, most of the empirical research on tort litigation has relied on federal 
court data (e.g., Litras and DeFrances, 1999) or data from state courts of general 
jurisdiction in major urban areas (e.g., DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Eisenberg, 
LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells, 2002; Smith et al., 1995). By contrast, our data 
were derived from two levels of trial courts in six geographic locations. Like most states, 
Georgia has trial courts of general jurisdiction (Superior Court) and trial courts of limited 
jurisdiction (State Court). Unlike most states, however, there is no amount in controversy 
limitation on State Court jurisdiction to hear tort cases.
5 Finally, many empirical studies 
of tort litigation rely on case records from one year (e.g., Smith, et al., 1995; DeFrances 
and Litras, 1999; Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells, 2002). Our data, 
however, consist of case records for four years.  
  We measured the impact of punitive damages on the processing of tort cases by 
looking at major decision points in the litigation process. These decision points include: 
(1) whether a case filed in any given year was disposed or pending; (2) whether a 
disposed case was resolved by trial or by some other procedure, including settlement; (3) 
whether a case disposed without trial was more likely to be disposed by settlement (e.g., 
voluntary dismissal with prejudice); (4) whether a case disposed without trial was more 
                                                           
5 O.C.G.A. sec. 15-7-4(a).   4
likely to be disposed by a voluntary dismissal without prejudice so that it could be re-
filed; 
6(5) whether a case disposed by trial involved a jury or bench trial; and (6) whether 
punitive damages were awarded in trials in which the plaintiff prevailed. For each of 
these decision points we measured whether there were any statistically significant 
differences between cases in which punitive damages were sought and those without such 
a claim. We also measured whether there were significant differences between cases in 
which the punitive damage claim was likely to be subject to the statutory limit on 
punitive damages and those likely to not be subject to this limit. 
  The subsequent sections of this paper are organized as follows. The second 
section reviews research about punitive damages, while the third section offers 
methodological information related to the data set, hypotheses, variable measurement, 
and statistical tests. The fourth and fifth sections deal, respectively, with the results and 
their implications. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
  The issue of punitive damages has sparked a large volume of theoretical, 
empirical and experimental literature. The theoretical purposes of punitive damages are to 
punish and deter wrongdoing (Dobbs, 2000). Sharkey advances an alternative rationale 
for punitive damages, and argues that punitive damages serve a beneficial role to 
compensate for “societal damages,” i.e., damages to others directly harmed but not before 
the court (Shockley, 2003). One body of scholarship maintains that current practices do 
                                                           
6 Under Georgia law, a suit that has been dismissed without prejudice can be re-filed within six 
months of the dismissal. O.C.G.A. sec. 9-2-61. Thus, this type of dismissal does not necessarily result in a 
final resolution of the underlying dispute. A previous study found that voluntary dismissals without 
prejudice account for approximately 20% of all dispositions of Georgia tort cases. (Eaton et al, 2000).   5
not advance either of these goals. For example, Polinsky and Shavell (1998) argued that 
punitive damages awarded against a corporation (instead of the individuals within the 
corporation) often unfairly punish innocent shareholders and customers, and thus fail to 
promote the punishment goal of such awards. Others maintain that the deterrence goal is 
undermined by the unpredictable nature of such awards. Karpoff and Lott (2000) found 
that only 1-2% of the variation in punitive damage awards can be explained and 
concluded that such awards are highly variable and unpredictable. Sunstein, Kahneman, 
and Schkade (1998) reached similar conclusions based on a controlled study of mock 
jurors. Sustein, Kahneman, Schkade, and Ritov (2002) evoked principles of cognitive 
psychology to explain why jurors are unable to translate qualitative moral judgments into 
quantitative numeric scales.  
  The jury is the focus of much criticism leveled against punitive damages. The 
general thrust of this body of scholarship is that jurors are “ill-informed and poorly 
equipped” to assess risk (Haistie and Viscusi, 1998). Jurors, it is said, are “given 
unlimited discretion but only limited guidance in deciding an amount of punitive 
damages” (Schkade, 2002). More specifically, jurors may be subject to a “hindsight 
bias,” meaning that they are more likely to view conduct as reckless and egregious after 
the fact of an injury (Hastie, Schkade, and Payne, 1999). Jurors are also thought to be 
disinclined to base the size of a punitive damage award on achieving optimal deterrence 
(Sunstein, Schkade and Kahneman, 2000) and cannot accurately calculate a punitive 
damage award using formulas (in the form of jury instructions) designed to achieve such 
deterrence (Viscusi, 2001 and 2002). Some studies suggest that juries tend to 
overestimate the risk of low probability-large loss events (Hastie and Viscusi, 1998;   6
Viscusi, 2001), will punish corporations for engaging in risk-cost analysis (Viscusi, 2001, 
2002), and are influenced by other legally inappropriate factors, such as the identities of 
the parties (Hastie et al., 1999). These criticisms have led to suggestions that judges 
rather than juries should decide whether punitive damages should be awarded, and if so, 
in what amount (Hastie and Viscusi, 1998; Mogin, 1998; Schkade et al., 2000; Sunstein 
et al., 1998; Sunstein, Kahneman, Schkade, and Ritov, 2002). 
  In contrast, another body of scholarship maintains that these criticisms are 
exaggerated. A number of empirical studies have found that punitive damages are rarely 
awarded (Eaton, et al. 2000; Eisenberg et al., 1997; Luban, 1998; Merrit and Berry, 1999; 
Rustad, 1992; Vidmar and Rose, 2001); are especially rare in the areas that have captured 
the most attention, products liability and medical malpractice (Eaton, et al., 2000; 
Eisenberg et al., 1997; Merritt and Berry, 1999); tend to be awarded in cases involving 
intentional misconduct (Rustad, 1997); and correlate strongly with compensatory 
damages in magnitude (Eisenberg et al., 1997; Eisenberg and Wells, 1999; Moller et al., 
1999; Vidmar and Rose, 2001). Moreover, the largest punitive damage awards are often 
reduced by post-verdict or appellate review (Koenig, 1998; Moller, 1996; Moller et al., 
1999, Peterson, 1987; Rustad, 1998). Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and 
Wells, (2002) explained how real world features of the legal system reduce the theoretical 
incoherence or effects of incoherence on punitive damages awards. One recent survey of 
the literature concludes that “lay decision-making is much more orderly in many respects 
than is suggested by the reform rhetoric” (Robbennolt, 2002).  
  The robust body of scholarship summarized in the preceding paragraphs concerns 
the actual awards of punitive damages at trial, but does not address the shadow effect that   7
such awards have on the processing of other claims. Here the literature is quite sparse. 
Polinsky (1997) hypothesized that the threat of punitive damages may carry greater 
consequences than actual verdicts, especially to the extent that the threat may give unfair 
bargaining power against corporate defendants and inflate both the rate and amount of 
settlements. He argued, “the cases in which punitive damages are likely to be of greatest 
potential importance at trial are also cases that may be disproportionately likely to settle 
... thus there could be very few judgments at trial in which punitive damages are awarded, 
yet settlement amounts might reflect a substantial component of punitive damages.” 
Priest asserts “[i]t is obvious and indisputable that a punitive damages claim increases the 
magnitude of the ultimate settlement and, indeed, affects the entire settlement process, 
increasing the likelihood of litigation” (Priest, 1996). Moller et al. (1999) suggested that a 
claim for punitive damages might attract adverse publicity, thereby creating an incentive 
for some defendants to settle cases.  
  Despite the potential importance of this shadow effect, there has been virtually no 
empirical research on the topic. Priest offers data on the percentage of tort cases in which 
punitive damages were sought in three Alabama counties in a two-year period (Priest, 
1996). He presents no data, however, to substantiate his claim that asserting a punitive 
damages claim will affect the settlement process and increase the magnitude of settlement 
payments. Koenig (1998) offered a preliminary analysis with data that were collected for 
other studies and reported that insurance adjusters give little weight to a claim for 
punitive damages during settlement negotiations. Kritzer and Zemans (1998) reviewed 
the existing literature and concluded “with perhaps one exception, what little systemic 
evidence we could find does not support the notion that the threat of punitive damages   8
casts a large shadow.” More recently, Vidmar and Rose (2001) in their study of punitive 
damages in Florida concluded that “despite frequent claims by tort reform proponents in 
Florida, and around the county, that punitive damages claims produces an in terrorem 
effect on corporate defendants, there is not systematically documented evidence that this 
is so.” Vidmar and Rose characterized such a shadow effect in products liability cases as 
“extremely improbable” given the exceedingly low number of such cases (other than 
those involving asbestos) in which punitive damages were awarded.  
  The one proposition on which all researchers seem to agree is that more data are 
needed to determine what impact, if any, a claim for punitive damages has on the 
processing of tort cases. We now turn to this question. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
A. Data  
  To examine the effect of the decision to seek punitive damages on key decision 
points in tort litigation, we use a unique data set of more than 25,000 tort cases filed in 
the State and Superior Courts in Georgia. The data, collected in 1998 and 1999, include 
every tort case filed between 1994-1997 in six counties in Georgia and nine different 
courts (Superior Courts in Bibb, Cobb, Fulton, Gwinnett, Irwin and Oconee counties and 
State Courts in Cobb, Fulton and Gwinnett counties). However, Fulton State Court data 
could only be collected for 1995-1997. In this data set, punitive damages were sought in a 
substantial portion of Superior Court cases (20%) and State Court cases (13%).
7  
                                                           
7 The percentage of tort claims seeking punitive damages in our data set is dramatically lower than 
the 65%-95.6% reported by Priest in his three county Alabama study.  Priest (1996).    9
  There are several distinct features of this data set. First, our six county sites were 
not randomly selected. Because there is no state agency or office that maintains any 
statewide record of civil court cases, we were not able to draw a random sample of cases 
from all the state’s Superior and State Courts. Therefore, we decided to collect tort 
litigation data in metropolitan Atlanta (Cobb, Fulton and Gwinnett counties) where the 
state’s population is concentrated. We added Bibb County to represent an urban area 
outside of Atlanta, Irwin County as a decidedly rural jurisdiction, and Oconee County as 
an historically rural county in the midst of substantial population growth. 
  Second, we studied every tort case in the aforementioned jurisdictions and 
identified them by filing date and not date of disposition. It was not possible to identify 
all tort cases between 1994 and 1997 and draw a random sample because in most 
counties research staff had to examine all civil litigation records simply to identify tort 
cases. Therefore, including the universe of tort cases identified in this process made the 
most sense. Similarly, it was not possible to identify a sampling frame on date of 
disposition or even examine civil case records in this fashion for the years in question, so 
we were left with date of filing as the basis of case selection. 
  Third, our data set includes cases from both Superior and State Courts. In 
Georgia, State Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction created by the General Assembly 
pursuant to local legislation. All major urban counties and many smaller counties have 
State Courts. In contrast to courts of limited jurisdiction in many states, State Court 
jurisdiction in Georgia is not limited by the amount in controversy (O.C.G.A. §15-7-4(a) 
(2) (1999)). Complex tort cases involving the highest potential awards may be tried in 
State as well as Superior Court. Given the scope of State Court jurisdiction and the sheer   10
volume of tort cases that they handle, one cannot get a complete picture of tort litigation 
in Georgia without accounting for State as well as Superior Courts.  
  That our data set consists of several different counties in one state, covers a four-
year time period, consists of the universe of related cases, is based on date of filing and 
not disposition, and that it includes both State and Superior Court records makes our 
study unique. The degree to which our descriptive findings are consistent with other 
large-scale studies of civil litigation (Eaton et al. 2000), however, helps to put these 
unique attributes in perspective. Of particular interest is the study conducted by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Center for State Courts (Litras et al. 2000). 
This research examines 15,000 tort trials selected from the nation’s 75 largest counties 
and disposed of in 1996. The general pattern of findings reported is remarkably similar to 
those we highlighted earlier (Eaton et al. 2000). 
  In addition to information on the decision to seek punitive damages, each tort case 
lists the number of attorneys, the number of litigants and defendants, the types of litigants 
and defendants, type of claim, and whether there was an allegation of a wrongful death. 
There is also information about how each case was disposed, pre-trial hearings, and the 
amounts and types of damages. Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the data. The 
first section, which lists the type of disposition, contains the dependent variables in the 
analysis. The other categories are type of case, case information, plaintiff and defendant 
information, the county and the year the case was filed.  
  In this research, we examine whether the decision to seek punitive damages 
affects many aspects of the processing of tort claims. In doing so, we offer an initial test 
of the proposition offered by Polinsky (1997) that punitive damages affect not only case   11
outcome but also case processing. Also, we examine how the effects of seeking punitive 
damages compare with other important factors that affect both case disposition and case 
processing. Figure 1 graphically illustrates key decision points in the resolution of tort 
cases. There were 25,562 cases filed in the six counties between 1994 and 1997. We 
analyze only data with non-missing observations for all the variables of interest, which 
leaves 25,348 cases, as shown in the top box of Figure 1. At the time of our collection, 
80.9% (20,514 cases) of the cases had been disposed and 19.1% (4,834 cases) were still 
pending. The vast majority (95.2%) of disposed cases were resolved without a trial. Of 
cases dismissed without a trial over half (54.9%) were settled. Of cases disposed by a 
trial, 20.2% were bench trials and 79.3% were jury trials.
8 Cases with bench and jury 
trials accounted for only 0.8% and 3.1% of all cases, respectively. 
  Table 2 compares cases in which punitive damages were sought to cases in which 
no request was made. Punitive damages were sought in only 3,729 cases, or 14.7% of the 
total. The raw averages show that cases seeking punitive damages were slightly less 
likely to be disposed (78.3% vs. 81.4%), disposed at trial (3.6% vs. 4.0%), disposed 
without a trial (74.6% vs. 77.4%), disposed with a jury trial (2.8% vs. 3.1%), and 
disposed by settlement (39.4% vs. 42.8%). Both types of cases were equally likely to be 
disposed with a bench trial (0.8%) and disposed with an option to relitigate (0.2%).  
  Although our data are very rich compared to what has been used in previous 
studies on tort law, two items are missing that we would have liked to have in the data 
set. First, court records typically included information on date of filing, but were 
frequently incomplete with respect to date of disposition. Although able to identify 
                                                           
8 The remaining 0.5% was directed verdicts.    12
disposed cases, we often could not identify the exact date of disposition. Consequently, 
we can test whether a filed case was disposed or pending, but cannot test whether cases 
that seek punitive damages take longer to be disposed. Second, data on settlement 
amounts are not available, and therefore, we cannot test whether the decision to seek 
punitive damages affects the settlement amount. Parties to a settlement are not required to 
disclose amounts, and sometimes the settlement explicitly prohibits parties from 
disclosing the amount.  
 
B. Estimation 
  Equation (1) outlines our basic empirical strategy:  
it t i i i i i it YEAR COUNTY LITIG TYPE INFO PD y ε β β β β β β α + + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1 ) Pr( (1) 
  There are six dependent variables,  it y , for case i in year t: (1) whether a case 
filed was disposed or pending;
9 (2) whether a case that was disposed was done so by trial 
or by some other procedure, including settlement;
10 (3) whether a case was more likely to 
be disposed by settlement (e.g., voluntary dismissal with prejudice); (4) whether a case 
was more likely to be disposed by a voluntary dismissal without prejudice so that it could 
be re-filed; (5) whether a case disposed by trial involved a jury and bench trial; and (6) 
whether punitive damages were awarded in trials with outcomes in favor of the plaintiff. 
Each of these outcomes is binary, and we will estimate the likelihood of their occurrences 
with a logit regression. 
                                                           
9 It would also be very interesting to examine whether seeking punitive damages affects the length 
of time for a case to be disposed. Unfortunately, the data include only whether a case was disposed and not 
length of time between initial filing and final disposition. 
10 Polinsky (1997) argued that seeking punitive damages may also affect the amount of a 
settlement. This proposition cannot be tested with these data, which do not include information about the 
amount of the settlement.    13
  For each of these six outcomes we present two regression specifications—one for 
cases likely to have capped punitive damages and one for cases unlikely to have caps.
11  
i TYPE  indicates the type of case, which is different for the two specifications.
12 The first 
reported specification in each table contains a regression for the six types of cases that 
would be likely to have punitive damage caps of $250,000—automobile, premise 
liability, professional malpractice, Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),
13 dangerous 
animal, and “Other”. We classify them as likely to be capped because they rarely involve 
intent to injure, and other than some automobile accident claims, rarely are brought about 
by use of alcohol or drugs. The second specification in each table contains a regression 
for the cases that would likely not have punitive damage caps, which include intentional 
torts, libel-slander, and defective products.
14  We classify these claims as likely to be 
uncapped because product liability claims are expressly exempted from the statutory cap 
and the conduct that gives rise to intentional tort and libel-slander claims is often 
characterized as involving intent to injure.  
  All the other control variables are included in both specifications. The next set of 
regressors,  i INFO  contains many variables about case characteristics, including whether 
                                                           
11 For each decision point we also tested, but did not report regressions of the entire sample and an 
interaction term between whether punitive damages were sought and whether the case was likely to have 
uncapped punitive damages. The results of these regressions were qualitatively similar to those reported 
here.   
12 Automobile cases constitute the largest fraction of total claims (67.0%), and are the omitted 
category in the first specification. Intentional torts, the most common type of case that is likely to be 
uncapped, is omitted from the second specification.  
13 The Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 creates a federal cause of action for 
railroad workers injured by the negligence of their employers. FELA claims can be brought in either federal 
or state courts.   
14 As mentioned in footnote 4, there is a statutorily imposed general limit of $250,000 on punitive 
damage awards. This ceiling does not apply in cases where the defendant acted with a specific intent to 
cause harm, acted under the influence of drugs or alcohol or in products liability claims. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-
5.1.    14
it was heard in State or Superior Court, whether the case involved a wrongful death, the 
numbers of plaintiffs and defendants, and the fraction of plaintiffs and defendants that 
appear pro se. As noted earlier, Georgia has trial courts of general jurisdiction (Superior 
Court) and trial courts of limited jurisdiction (State Court). Unlike most states, however, 
the trial court of limited jurisdiction in Georgia can preside over tort cases without any 
limit on the amount in controversy. Therefore, tort actions for any amount may be filed in 
either the trial court of general jurisdiction (Superior Court) or the trial court of more 
limited jurisdiction (State Court). Because cases with more litigants are typically more 
complex, the numbers of plaintiffs and defendants may proxy case complexity, which 
may affect how the case proceeds through the legal system. Because litigants who 
represent themselves will have less information and knowledge than attorneys, pro se 
litigants will have greater uncertainty than other litigants. 
  i LITIG  describes the type of litigants—both plaintiffs and defendants, who are 
categorized into the following groups: individuals, insurance companies, businesses, 
financial institutions, medical institutions, and governmental agencies.
15 These variables 
will allow us to estimate whether outcomes are affected by the composition of litigants.  
  i COUNTY  designates the location of the case, and controls for systematic 
differences across jurisdictions. The six counties are Bibb, Cobb, Fulton, Gwinnett, 
Irwin, and Oconee.
16 The last variable,  t YEAR , is a set of year fixed effects that controls 
for systematic changes over time.
17 
                                                           
15 Individuals comprise the largest group of plaintiffs (85.4%) and defendants (76.7%), and are the 
omitted categories in the regressions.  
16 In the regression Fulton County, which contains 53.9% of all cases is the omitted county. 




A. Likelihood of the Case Being Disposed 
  Our first step is to understand what types of cases are quickly resolved and which 
remain pending. To accomplish this we run a logit regression of whether the case was 
disposed by the time we obtained the data. Figure 1 shows that 19.1% of the cases were 
still pending, and 80.9% were disposed. We expect the least complicated cases to be 
disposed more quickly. Although we have no direct measure of case complexity, we 
proxy it with a variable for the number of participants in the case. Products liability and 
malpractice cases also tend to be legally and factually more complex. We also expect that 
cases are less likely to be disposed in Superior than State courts. This anticipated 
difference is a function of the mandatory jurisdiction of Superior courts in Georgia. All 
divorce cases and criminal felonies must be filed in Superior Court, with the latter taking 
precedence over civil cases. Many plaintiffs’ attorneys believe they can get a trial date 
more quickly in State than Superior Court. Last, controlling for other factors, we expect 
that cases filed earlier will be more likely to be resolved. Therefore, we anticipate that 
cases filed in 1994 will be most likely to be disposed and cases filed in 1997, the last year 
of the data, to be least likely to be disposed.  
  Table 3 displays the results of the logit regression that predicts the likelihood of a 
case being disposed. Column 1 includes cases that are likely to be capped while Column 
2 includes the cases that are likely to be uncapped. Contrary to the claim that seeking 
punitive damages would delay the processing of the case, both specifications show that   16
the decision to seek punitive damages has no statistical effect on the likelihood of case 
disposal.  
  As expected, cases in Superior Courts are much less likely to be disposed. The 
marginal effects
18 implied by the point estimates in Table 3 imply that controlling for all 
the other factors, cases that are likely to be capped and are in Superior Court are 1.9% 
less likely to be disposed while cases that are unlikely to be capped and are in Superior 
Court are 3.0% less likely to be disposed.  
  Other statistically significant results for cases likely to be capped (Column 1) 
show decreases in the probability of a disposition—a FELA case (4.3%) and having 
insurance (1.1%) or medical companies (6.0%) as defendants. An additional defendant 
decreases the likelihood of disposition by 0.7%. In contrast, cases are more likely to be 
disposed when the claim is categorized as “Other” (3.6%), the plaintiff is an insurance 
company (5.2%), and the defendant is a business (1.1%). An additional plaintiff increases 
the probability of disposition by 0.8%. 
  In cases likely to be uncapped (Column 2), the likelihood of disposition is 
decreased by 1.0% for an additional plaintiff and 2.0% for an additional defendant. Libel-
slander cases are 5.6% more likely and defective product cases are 8.2% more likely to 
be disposed than intentional torts. Cases are more likely to be disposed when the plaintiff 
is an insurance firm (10.3%), or the defendant is a financial institution (11.1%) or the 
government (6.8%). A financial institution as a plaintiff reduces the likelihood of 
disposing cases likely to be uncapped by 37.2%. 
                                                           
18 The tables report point estimates from the logit regressions. Although these estimates provide 
the correct qualitative sign, they do not directly imply a quantitative magnitude. Therefore, in the text we 
also report the marginal effects of the statistically significant results.    17
  In both columns, the results for the years are exactly as predicted. Cases filed in 
1994 are most likely to be disposed, followed by those filed in 1995 and 1996, while 
cases filed in 1997 are least likely to be resolved.  
 
B. Likelihood of a Case Being Disposed with a Trial 
  Studies have consistently shown that the vast majority of cases are not resolved in 
the trial court, and our data confirm this. Of disposed cases in our sample, 95.2% of them 
are resolved without a trial. Table 4 evaluates the likelihood of a case being disposed with 
a trial. The coefficient estimate on whether to seek punitive damages in Column 1 is close 
to zero and not statistically significant. An additional plaintiff reduces the likelihood of a 
trial by -0.6%. In Column 2, the coefficient estimate on requesting punitive damages is 
not statistically significant at the .10 level. However, it would be significant at the .15 
level, thus providing some weak evidence that cases likely to be uncapped that request 
punitive damages may be slightly more likely to be resolved by a trial.  
 
C. Likelihood of a Case Being Settled 
  The most likely resolution of a case is settlement, which accounts for 52.2% of 
the disposed cases in our sample. Theory suggests that greater uncertainty about the 
outcome decreases the likelihood of a settlement (Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello 
2000). Because all parties involved must pay large fixed costs to go to trial, cases where 
the plaintiffs and defendants have significantly different expectations about the outcome 
are more likely to go to trial. If both parties agree on the range of probable outcomes 
before the trial, then the litigants can make themselves better off by settling and avoiding   18
the trial costs. Because the outcome of these simple cases is relatively clear, they are 
more likely to be settled while more complex cases are less likely to be settled.  
  Table 5 examines the likelihood of a case being settled. The estimate of the effect 
of seeking punitive damages reported in Column 1 is negative and not distinguishable 
from 0, thereby suggesting that the threat of punitive damages is not being used to force 
settlements in cases likely to be capped. Also, the likelihood of settling is reduced by an 
additional plaintiff (4.9%) and an additional percentage increase in the fraction of pro se 
plaintiffs (0.2%). An additional defendant increases the likelihood of settling by 1.2%. 
  Column 2 of Table 5 is notable because it is the only time in the paper (with the 
exception of whether punitive damages are actually awarded) that the estimate for a 
request for punitive damages has a statistically significant result. In contrast to the 
Polinksy (1997) contention that cases that seek punitive damages disproportionately 
settle, this evidence indicates that in cases likely to be uncapped, the decision to seek 
punitive damages actually reduces the likelihood to settle.  Also, cases that are likely to 
be uncapped are less likely to be settled if they have a wrongful death claim and if they 
are heard in Superior Court rather than State Court.  
 
D. Likelihood of the Case Being Voluntarily Dismissed without Prejudice 
  Over one-fifth of the cases that are dismissed without a trial are voluntarily 
dismissed without prejudice. Under Georgia Code §9-2-61 (1999), the state gives the 
plaintiff the right to voluntarily dismiss his or her case and re-file it within six months, 
subject to any relevant statutes of limitations. In practice, this law allows plaintiffs to start 
a case and obtain a temporary delay if problems should arise. One might predict that this   19
option would be exercised more frequently in complex cases that are more likely to have 
unexpected twists. Consequently, we anticipate the estimated coefficient on most types of 
cases will be positive and significant as compared to automobile accident claims.  
  Table 6 shows the likelihood that a case will be voluntarily dismissed without 
prejudice. Like most of the other results, the decision to seek punitive damages does not 
affect this outcome in either specification. The fraction of pro se plaintiffs reduces the 
likelihood of the outcome for both types of cases. Column 1 indicates that wrongful death 
cases are 3.4% less likely to be voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Also, an 
additional plaintiff increases the probability of this option being exercised by 4.2%. This 
is not surprising as litigants in cases with multiple plaintiffs may discover that the 
plaintiffs have separate and perhaps divergent interests.  
 
E. Likelihood of a Jury Trial 
  As noted previously, much of the criticism of tort litigation has been directed to 
the role and function of the jury. Critics of punitive damages maintain that juries are more 
likely to award punitive damages with greater frequency and for larger sums than judges. 
Since juries are thought to favor the plaintiff and since the plaintiff is entitled to a jury 
trial absent an explicit waiver, one might expect that a punitive damage claim would 
increase the likelihood of a jury trial. 
  Table 7 examines the determinants of jury trials vs. bench trials. Jury and bench 
trials are rare phenomena, as they comprise 3.1% and 0.8% of all cases filed, 
respectively. In Column 1, the result for cases that seek punitive damages is not 
statistically significant, and its coefficient estimate is negative, the opposite of what   20
would be expected if plaintiffs preferred to present their case before juries. For cases 
likely to be uncapped (Column 2) the coefficient estimate on the request for punitive 
damages is positive, which is more consistent with the contention that plaintiffs seeking 
punitive damages would prefer to have a jury trial. However, its coefficient estimate is 
much less than its standard error, and therefore, is nowhere close to being statistically 
significant.  
  Pro se plaintiffs (in Column 1) and defendants (in both specifications) are less 
likely to have jury trials. In Column 2, Superior Court cases are 40.6% more likely to 
have a jury trial, and an additional defendant decreases by 11.4% the likelihood of having 
a jury trial. 
 
F. Likelihood of Being Awarded Punitive Damages 
  There have been many criticisms of punitive damages. Some of the most 
frequently articulated concerns focus on the lack of jury competency in assigning such 
awards and assume that juries are much more likely than judges to award punitive 
damages. Critics contend that juries exhibit hindsight bias, are unable to evaluate risk 
rationally, and are biased against corporations, particularly very large and prosperous 
ones.  
  Contrary to popular belief, punitive damages are awarded very rarely. This 
Georgia sample contains only 15 punitive damage awards, or less than 0.1% of the entire 
sample. Table 7 evaluates the likelihood of being awarded punitive damages conditioned 
on winning a trial. Because there are so few observations and so few punitive damage 
awards, the standard errors are quite high and very few variables in the entire regression   21
are statistically significant. The first column shows that cases that seek punitive damages 
are more likely to receive a punitive award; a result that would be astonishing if it were 
not true. There is no reported estimate for the request for punitive damages in Column 2, 
because there are only 25 observations and every case that made a request for punitives 
was given an award. 
  Both specifications indicate that there is a statistically significant greater chance 
of a punitive damage award in Superior than State court. The coefficient estimate in 
Column 2 implies that a bench trial increases the likelihood of being awarded punitive 
damages by 8.4%, consistent with Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells 
(2002). After controlling for other factors, juries in Georgia are not more likely than 
judges to award punitive damages.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
  Many critics of tort law and litigation have alleged that allowing plaintiffs to seek 
punitive damages significantly increases the costs imposed throughout the judicial system 
as many file claims in hopes of forcing large settlements or winning exorbitant punitive 
damages. Most studies confine their attention to a very narrow range of issues when 
investigating punitive damages; specifically they evaluate what occurs at trial. Although 
this question is important, trials account for only a small fraction of cases filed, and 
therefore, such studies essentially ignore effects that could occur throughout the rest of 
the system. This unique data set that includes all cases filed allows us to provide one of 
the first analyses of the impact of punitive damages throughout the entire tort litigation 
process.    22
  The results show that contrary to the expectation of many critics (e.g., Polinsky, 
1997; Priest, 1996) the decision to seek punitive damages has no statistically significant 
impact on most phases of the litigation process. Specifically, we found that the decision 
to seek punitive damages had no effect on (1) whether a case filed in any given year was 
disposed or pending; (2) whether a case that was disposed was done so by trial or by 
some other procedure, including settlement; (3) whether a case that was disposed by 
means other than a trial was more likely to have been settled; and (4) whether a case that 
was disposed by means other than a trial was more likely to have been disposed by a 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice so that it could be re-filed. These findings are 
consistent with those reported by Koenig (1998) that the inclusion of a claim for punitive 
damages does not have much effect on the processing of tort claims. They also lend 
additional support to the observations of Kritzer and Zemans (1998) and Vidmar and 
Rose (2001) that there is little systemic evidence that the threat of punitive damages casts 
a large shadow. 
  Seeking punitive damages only affected two of the outcome variables. Cases in 
which punitive damages are sought were more likely to have punitive damages awarded, 
an obvious and expected result. However, the second result was unexpected. In cases that 
are resolved by trial, those seeking punitive damages claims are more likely to be tried by 
a judge. This finding may be of some interest to those who study differences between 
bench and jury trials. Conventional wisdom posits that juries have a pro-plaintiff bias and 
are more likely to find liability when a judge would not. This conventional wisdom has 
been challenged by a number of studies. Although related empirical evidence is limited, 
several studies have found that plaintiffs actually enjoy a higher success rate in bench as   23
compared to jury trials, at least in certain types of torts (Clermont and Eisenberg, 1992; 
Eaton and Talarico, 1996; Eaton et al., 2000; DeFrances and Litras, 1999). With regard to 
punitive damages in particular, Eaton et al., (2000) found that punitive damages were 
awarded in a higher percentage of Georgia bench trials than jury trials. Eisenberg, 
LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells (2002) reported similar findings using a 
national data set, but noted that the differences were not statistically significant. This 
study concluded that “[j]uries and judges award punitive damages at about the same rate, 
and their punitive awards bear about the same relation to their compensatory awards.” 
Hersch and Vicusi (2002), employing a different methodology on the same data used by 
Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells (2002), concluded that juries are 
more likely to make punitive damage awards and make larger awards than judges.  
  Regardless of how similar or different judges perform as compared to juries in 
awarding punitive damages, it is interesting that the parties are more likely to select a 
bench trial in cases involving uncapped punitive damages claims. As a general matter, 
bench trials occur only when both parties agree to waive their right to a trial by jury. 
Further research is needed to better understand what set of circumstances might lead both 
parties to agree to a bench trial in cases involving uncapped punitive damages. 
  We did find some differences in the effects of capped and uncapped punitive 
damages on case processing. Tort suits with uncapped punitive damage claims were more 
likely to be disposed by trial as compared to suits with capped punitive damage claims. 
Furthermore, tort suits with uncapped punitive damage claims were less likely to be 
disposed by settlement than suits with capped punitive damage claims. These findings are 
inconsistent with Polinsky’s (1997) hypothesis that the threat of punitive damages will   24
coerce more settlements. In fact, our data tend to suggest just the opposite—a claim for 
uncapped punitive damages impedes rather than coerces settlement. Perhaps this is 
because an uncapped punitive damage claim creates greater uncertainty as to the value of 
the suit. The greater the disparity between the parties’ valuation of the case, the less 
likely a suit is to settle (Mnookin, et al. 2000).  
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Notes:   The number in parentheses () is the fraction of total cases (25,348). 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics  
 
Variable   Number  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Type of Disposition          
     Pending  25,348  0.191  0.393  0  1 
     Disposed  25,348  0.809  0.393  0  1 
     Disposed Without a Trial  25,348  0.770  0.421  0  1 
     Disposed by Settlement  25,348  0.423  0.494  0  1 
     Disposed with the option to  
       Relitigate 
25,348 0.164  0.370  0  1 
     Disposed With a Trial  25,348  0.039  0.194  0  1 
     Disposed With a Bench Trial  25,348  0.008  0.088  0  1 
     Disposed With a Jury Trial  25,348  0.031  0.173  0  1 
          
          
Type of Case           
    Intentional Tort  25,348  0.093  0.290  0  1 
    Libel-Slander  25,348  0.010  0.100  0  1 
    Defective Product  25,348  0.027  0.162  0  1 
    Automobile  25,348  0.670  0.470  0  1 
    Premise Liability  25,348  0.107  0.309  0  1 
    Professional Malpractice 25,348  0.039  0.194  0  1 
    FELA  25,348  0.023  0.151  0  1 
    Dangerous Animal  25,348  0.004  0.064  0  1 
    Other  25,348  0.027  0.162  0  1 
          
Case Information          
    Superior Court  25,348  0.309  0.462  0  1 
    State Court  25,348  0.691  0.462  0  1 
    Request for Punitive Damages 25,348  0.147  0.354  0  1 
    Wrongful Death  25,348  0.025  0.157  0  1 
    Number of Plaintiffs  25,348  1.352  0.988  1  64 
    Number of Defendants  25,348  1.657  1.389  1  42 
    Percent of Plaintiffs Pro Se  25,348  1.698  13.850  0  100 
    Percent of Defendants Pro Se  25,348  2.656  23.901  0  100 
          
Plaintiff Type           
    Individual  25,348  0.859  0.348  0  1 
    Insurance  25,348  0.121  0.326  0  1 
    Business  25,348  0.024  0.155  0  1 
    Finance  25,348  0.00047  0.022  0  1 
    Medical  25,348  0.00063  0.025  0  1 
    Government  25,348  0.001  0.034  0  1 
    Other  25,348  0.002  0.043  0  1 
          
Defendant Type           
    Individual  25,348  0.767  0.423  0  1 
    Insurance  25,348  0.074  0.262  0  1 
    Business  25,348  0.324  0.468  0  1   32
Variable   Number  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
    Finance  25,348  0.005  0.070  0  1 
    Medical  25,348  0.030  0.169  0  1 
    Government  25,348  0.028  0.164  0  1 
    Other  25,348  0.002  0.045  0  1 
          
County          
   Bibb  25,348  0.037  0.189  0  1 
   Cobb  25,348  0.232  0.422  0  1 
   Fulton  25,348  0.537  0.499  0  1 
   Gwinnet  25,348  0.187  0.390  0  1 
   Irwin  25,348  0.002  0.043  0  1 
   Oconee  25,348  0.005  0.071  0  1 
          
Year          
   1994  25,348  0.150  0.357  0  1 
   1995   25,348  0.279  0.448  0  1 
   1996  25,348  0.282  0.450  0  1 





Comparing Cases in Which Punitive Damages are Sought with  
Cases in Which No Punitive Damages are Sought 
 
  Punitive Damages  
Sought 
Punitive Damages  
Not Sought 
Number of Filings   3,729  21,619 
Percent of Filings  14.7  85.3 
Percent Disposed   78.3  81.4 
Percent Disposed at Trial   3.6  4.0 
Percent Disposed Without a Trial  74.6  77.4 
Percent Disposed With a Jury Trial  2.8  3.1 
Percent Disposed With a Bench Trial  0.8  0.8 
Percent Disposed by Settlement  39.4  42.8 
Percent Disposed with Option to Relitigate  0.2  0.2 
Note: There were 3,729 cases that sought punitive damages and 21,619 cases that did not seek 
punitive damages.  
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Table 3 
Likelihood of a Case Being Disposed 
Logit Regression 
  (1) Cases Likely to Be Capped  (2) Cases Likely to Be Uncapped 






Case Information       
    Request for Punitive Damages  -0.072  0.063 0.060 0.101 
    Superior Court  -0.166***  0.047  -0.178*  0.104 
    Wrongful Death  0.035  0.123  -0.199  0.270 
    Number of Plaintiffs  0.072***  0.025  -0.060*  0.032 
    Number of Defendants  -0.063***  0.017  -0.123***  0.023 
    Percent of Plaintiffs Pro Se  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
    Percent of Defendants Pro Se  -0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002 
       
Type of Case              
    Libel-Slander  n/a   n/a  0.375**  0.181 
    Defective Product  n/a  n/a  0.544***  0.129 
    Premise Liability  -0.010  0.071  n/a  N/a 
    Professional Malpractice  -0.099  0.119  n/a  N/a 
    FELA  -0.348***  0.131  n/a  N/a 
    Dangerous Animal  -0.299  0.259  n/a  N/a 
    Other  0.367***  0.123  n/a  N/a 
       
Plaintiff Type – individual omitted     
    Insurance  0.542***  0.068  0.771***  0.265 
    Business  -0.019  0.148  -0.133  0.179 
    Finance  .  .  -1.656**  0.821 
    Medical  0.440  1.141  -0.129  1.084 
    Government  0.329  0.758  -0.555  1.676 
    Other  -0.297  0.569  -0.084  0.745 
       
Defendant Type – individual omitted     
    Insurance  -0.370***  0.072  -0.010  0.369 
    Business  0.097*  0.057  -0.159  0.114 
    Finance  -0.122  0.401  0.867**  0.389 
    Medical  -0.457***  0.144  0.364  0.352 
    Government  0.125  0.134  0.471*  0.282 
    Other  -0.380  0.380  .  . 
       
Year       
    1994  3.300***  0.118  2.945***  0.226 
    1995  2.189***  0.059  2.168***  0.134 
    1996  0.998***  0.043  1.178***  0.112 
       
Intercept 0.572***  0.054  0.514***  0.147 
County Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size   22,054    3,280   
Notes:   ***, **, and * designate significant at 0.01, 0.05 and .10 levels, respectively.   34
  Automobile cases are omitted for cases likely to be capped. Intentional tort cases are omitted 
for cases likely to be uncapped. 
  n/a indicates that this variable was not used in the regression.   
  “.” indicates that no estimate was made because this variable could be predicted by other 
variables.    35
 Table 4 
Likelihood of a Case Being Disposed With a Trial,  
Conditioned on Being Disposed 
Logit Regression 
 
  (1) Cases Likely to Be Capped  (2) Cases Likely to Be Uncapped 








Case Information       
    Request for Punitive 
Damages 
-0.125  0.130 0.339 0.229 
    Superior Court  -0.036  0.087  -0.042  0.237 
    Wrongful Death  -0.493  0.348  -0.198  0.749 
    Number of Plaintiffs  -0.154**  0.063  -0.007  0.058 
    Number of Defendants  -0.087  0.053  -0.097  0.084 
    Percent of Plaintiffs Pro Se  0.001  0.003  0.003  0.004 
    Percent of Defendants Pro Se  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002 
Intercept -2.960***  0.147  -2.674***  0.357 
Type of Case Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Plaintiff Type Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Defendant Type Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size   18,058    2,361   
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. 
 
 Table 5 
Likelihood of a Case Being Settled,  
Conditioned on Being Dismissed without a Trial 
Logit Regression 
 
  (1) Cases Likely to Be Capped  (2) Cases Likely to Be Uncapped 








Case Information       
    Request for Punitive Damages -0.014  0.055  -0.275***  0.095 
    Superior Court  -0.012  0.041  -0.289***  0.105 
    Wrongful Death  -0.130  0.108  -0.658**  0.269 
    Number of Plaintiffs  -0.202***  0.022  -0.013  0.039 
    Number of Defendants  0.048***  0.018  -0.035  0.026 
    Percent of Plaintiffs Pro Se  -0.009***  0.001  -0.016***  0.003 
    Percent of Defendants Pro Se  -0.001  0.001  -0.009**  0.004 
Intercept 0.721***  0.055  -0.213***  0.159 
Type of Case Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Plaintiff Type Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Defendant Type Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size   17,219    2,296   
Notes: See Notes to Table 3.   36
Table 6 
Likelihood of a Case Being Voluntarily Dismissed without Prejudice,  
Conditioned on Being Dismissed without a Trial 
Logit Regression 
 
  (1) Cases Likely to Be Capped  (2) Cases Likely to Be Uncapped 






Case Information       
    Request for Punitive Damages  -0.064  0.068 0.061 0.112 
    Superior Court  0.018  0.049  0.164  0.121 
    Wrongful Death  -0.223*  0.130  0.218  0.278 
    Number of Plaintiffs  0.260***  0.023  0.051  0.044 
    Number of Defendants  -0.014  0.021  0.052  0.026 
    Percent of Plaintiffs Pro Se  -0.005**  0.002  -0.006**  0.003 
    Percent of Defendants Pro Se  -0.002*  0.001  0.002  0.001 
Intercept -1.845***  0.065  -1.394***  0.179 
Type of Case Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Plaintiff Type Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Defendant Type Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size   17,215    2,301   
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. 
 
Table 7 
Likelihood of a Jury Trial,  
Conditioned on Having a Trial 
Logit Regression 
 
  (1) Cases Likely to Be Capped  (2) Cases Likely to Be Uncapped 








Case Information       
    Request for Punitive Damages  -0.703  0.471 0.474 0.663 
    Superior Court  0.608  0.443  1.839**  0.750 
    Wrongful Death  .  .  .  . 
    Number of Plaintiffs  0.146  0.334  0.234  0.379 
    Number of Defendants  -0.120  0.226  -0.471*  0.267 
    Percent of Plaintiffs Pro Se  -0.032***  0.009  -0.010  0.020 
    Percent of Defendants Pro Se  -0.038***  0.011  -0.038***  0.013 
Intercept  3.213*** 0.713 -0.010 0.936 
Type of Case Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Plaintiff Type Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Defendant Type Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample  Size    857   102  
Notes: See Notes to Table 3.   37
 Table 8 
Likelihood of a Being Awarded Punitive Damages,  
Conditioned on Winning the Case 
Logit Regression 
 
  (1) Cases Likely to Be Capped  (2) Cases Likely to Be Uncapped 








Case Information       
    Request for Punitive Damages  6.035**  2.545  .  . 
    Bench Trial  -1.733  2.571  14.862***  2.346 
    Superior Court  28.845***  5.902  20.169***  . 
    Wrongful Death  .  .  .  . 
    Number of Plaintiffs  1.615  2.310  1.504  2.258 
    Number of Defendants  -19.001***  2.323  -0.590  1.006 
    Percent of Plaintiffs Pro Se  .  .  0.056  . 
    Percent of Defendants Pro Se  .  .  .  . 
Intercept -50.401  .  -88.400***  5.380 
Type of Case Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Plaintiff Type Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Defendant Type Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample  Size    329   25  
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. 
 